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abstRact: Searches are an example of investigative actions aimed at 
the discovery of evidence, and failures in conducting them lawfully 
and reasonably have a direct impact on the admissibility of evidence 
during a trial. But searches by their nature also significantly interfere 
with the rights of the individual, which makes them a coercive tool 
that can very easily deprive a person of their privacy and dignity. For 
that reason, provisions concerning search must be shaped in a way 
that will reconcile the effectiveness of the investigation with adequate 
protection against unlawful searches. one such safeguard is the question 
of the authority empowered to order searches that will successfully 
safeguard the rights of the individual. While it is a rule in some countries 
(e.g. uSA and Germany) that the issuing of search warrants remains 
exclusively in the hands of the judge, some countries (e.g. Poland and 
italy) vest that power in the hands of the prosecutor. However, since the 
majority of searches are conducted without a warrant, it is necessary 
1 This work is a result of the research project financed by the Polish National Sci-
ence Center 2018/30/E/HS5/00338. The earlier version of this article has been 
presented during the 8th Annual Conference of the Younger Comparativists Con-
ference of the ASCL held at the McGill Law School on May 10, 2019. I am grateful 
to all participants for their helpful comments. 
2 PhD in Law from the University of Wrocław (Poland) and LL.M. from the Uni-
versity of Ottawa (Canada). Assistant Professor at the Department of Criminal 
Procedure at the Faculty of Law, Administration and Economics (University of 
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to analyze in parallel whether the warrantless searches should be 
left solely to the discretion of the executing authority or whether 
they should be placed under the more careful scrutiny of another 
authority. This will be done with the aim of identifying solutions 
that provide the best protection for a person against unreasonable 
and disproportionate searches. 
KeywoRds: search; search warrant; criminal investigation; prosecutor; 
prosecutorial powers.
Resumo:	Buscas	e	apreensões	são	exemplos	de	meios	de	investigação	
dirigidos	à	descoberta	de	elementos	probatórios,	e	irregularidades	na	sua	
condução	de	modo	legal	e	razoável	acarretam	impacto	direto	na	admissi-
bilidade	da	prova	durante	o	juízo.	Contudo,	buscas	e	apreensões	por	sua	
natureza	também	refletem	significativamente	em	intervenções	nos	direitos	
individuais,	caracterizando	tais	medidas	como	coercitivas	e	com	risco	de	
violações	à	privacidade	e	à	dignidade	da	pessoa.	Por	esse	motivo,	a	regu-
lamentação	das	buscas	e	apreensões	deve	se	dar	de	um	modo	compatível	
com	a	necessidade	de	efetividade	das	investigações	e	com	uma	proteção	
adequada	contra	atos	abusivos.	Uma	dessas	garantias	é	determinada	pela	
definição	da	autoridade	competente	para	ordenar	as	buscas	e	apreensões	e	
a	sua	capacidade	de	proteger	os	direitos	individuais.	Enquanto	é	uma	regra	
em	alguns	países	(ex.	EUA	e	Alemanha)	que	a	expedição	de	um	mandado	
de	busca	e	apreensão	somente	pode	ser	determinada	pelo	juízo,	em	outros	
(ex.	Polônia	e	Itália)	isso	pode	ser	feito	pelo	Ministério	Público.	Entretanto,	
como	a	maioria	das	buscas	e	apreensões	são	realizadas	sem	mandado,	é	
necessário	analisar	em	paralelo	se	medidas	sem	mandado	deveriam	ser	
relegadas	à	discricionariedade	da	autoridade	executante	ou	se	deveriam	ser	
submetidas	a	rigoroso	controle	por	outra	autoridade.	Isso	será	feito	com	o	
objetivo	de	identificar	soluções	para	assegurar	a	melhor	proteção	à	pessoa	
contra	buscas	e	apreensões	abusivas	e	desproporcionais.	
PalavRas-chave:	busca	e	apreensão;	mandado;	investigação	criminal;	Mi-
nistério	Público;	poderes	da	promotoria.
I. IntRoductIon
Significant importance must be attached to search as an example 
of investigative action aimed at the discovery of evidence. Failures in 
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conducting lawful and reasonable searches have a direct impact on the 
admissibility of evidence during a trial. Nonetheless, searches in their 
nature significantly interfere with the rights of the individual, such as 
the right to privacy, personal inviolability, and inviolability of the home. 
For that reason, legal provisions concerning search must be shaped in a 
way that reconciles the effectiveness of the investigation with adequate 
protection against unreasonable searches and unlawful interference with 
the individual’s rights and freedoms. One such safeguard is the question 
of the authority empowered to order searches that will successfully 
safeguard the rights of the individual.
Therefore, the goal of this work is to establish which authority 
within the criminal justice system shall retain control over searches. The 
foremost question is which authority should be qualified to issue search 
warrants and what should be the minimal features of such authority. Even 
though practice shows that the rule understood as prior authorization 
to conduct a search has become an exception, it is still important as 
it gives the most protection to an individual. Only prior evaluation of 
the necessity of conducting a search may give full, comprehensive, and 
desirable protection against unreasonable infringements of rights. If the 
search has already taken place, even the most effective remedy can only 
be considered cosmetic treatment for what has been done. But making 
a prior decision to conduct a search raises some additional concerns, 
such as whether the results of such a decision shall remain unverified 
until the evidence obtained during the search is introduced at trial, or 
whether it should be subject to some form of control. And if so, who 
should undertake it, and when.
However, taking into account that the majority of searches are 
conducted without a warrant due to a certain number of exceptions, it 
is necessary to analyze in parallel whether these warrantless searches 
should be left solely to the discretion of the executing authority or whether 
they should remain under the more careful scrutiny of another authority. 
Therefore, the issue of grounds that allow police officers to conduct a 
search without a warrant under exigent circumstances will be discussed 
accordingly. Furthermore, the analysis will focus on which authority, if 
any, is capable of controlling such not preauthorized searches. It seems 
problematic to leave warrantless searches without any further control 
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unless evidence obtained during such a search is introduced during a 
subsequent trial. Should the legality of such search only be a theme for 
discussion when the evidence is to be produced during trial? Or should the 
individual whose rights were infringed by the unlawful search be entitled 
to immediate and effective remedy even when the case is dismissed or 
disposed without a trial?
The discussion leading to the determination of the authority 
eligible to decide whether to allow a search or not will be done through 
comparative research. This will allow the consideration of different 
perspectives and different resolutions to the same problem that authorities 
in all countries encounter while investigating crimes. The choice of 
countries for the comparative research was made with the aim of showing 
a variety of approaches to criminal procedure in general. Therefore, the 
United States will be used as a good example of a common law system 
with very well-developed case law in particular regarding search. In fact, 
the US will be used as a starting point for the further analysis, since the 
country has a long-standing perspective on what kind of authority shall 
be responsible for making the decision to search a person, an object, or 
a premises. 
On the other side of this discussion shall be Continental 
European countries easily identified through the strong involvement of 
the prosecutor in the course of the criminal investigation. While in the 
US the prosecutor most commonly only becomes engaged in a criminal 
process when the decision to charge a person with a crime must be 
made, in countries that use the Continental system the prosecutor is 
a central figure of the criminal investigation. This is equally true for 
Germany, Italy, and Poland, chosen as examples on the Continental side. 
Therefore, it must also be taken into consideration whether the role of 
the prosecutor during a criminal investigation may be a factor or even a 
deciding element in assigning such competences as ordering a search to 
the prosecutor. Hence, another question that shall be asked is whether 
the role that the prosecutor plays during an investigation influences the 
decision to whom the competence to order a search should be assigned. 
The choice of Germany is dictated by the fact that this country 
is often seen as the mother of Continental law. In contrast, Italy is an 
interesting example of a country that, being traditionally associated 
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with an inquisitorial system, has shifted towards the adversarial model 
through an almost epic change of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 
19883. Therefore, it seems interesting to see how this new approach has 
changed the Italian model of criminal investigation and whether the 
position of the actors at this stage of a criminal process, in particular 
with regard to the authority to order a search, resembles the American 
example to which Italy has been aspiring. Finally, Poland has been chosen 
as a country not commonly considered in legal comparative analyses. 
Poland however is also a country that for many years found itself under 
the Soviet regime, which has inevitably had a lasting impact on Polish 
criminal procedures. Therefore, it may be seen as representative of a 
group of countries belonging to the old Eastern Block.
First, a descriptive analysis of normative regulations as adopted in 
each country will be provided. This will be done in the form of separate 
reports for each chosen country (US, Italy, Poland and Germany) according 
to the adopted method of comparative research4. Each subchapter will 
discuss the procedure for issuing a search warrant with a focus on the 
authority entitled to make such decisions as well as options to challenge 
the conducted preauthorized search, if applicable. Then, the discussion 
will move in the case of each country to guarantees provided to the 
individual when it comes to warrantless searches. In particular, the 
necessity to obtain post-approvals by officers that executed the search as 
well as remedies available to the individual in the case of an infringement 
of their rights will be analyzed. 
This comparative analysis aims to lay a foundation for further 
comparative analysis with the aim of identifying those resolutions 
3 On the Italian reform of the criminal process see for example AMODIO, En-
nio; SELVAGGI, Eugenio. An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Country: The 
1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. Temple Law Review, n. 62, 1989, p. 
1211; ILLUMINATI, Giulio. The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure 
in Italy (Italian Criminal Procedure Code of 1988). Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review, n. 4, 2005, p. 567; PANZAVOLTA, Michele. Re-
forms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle for an Accusatorial Crim-
inal Law System. North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial 
Regulation, n. 30, 2004, p. 577. 
4 ZWEIGERT, Konrad; KÖTZ, Hein. Introduction to Comparative Law. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2011, p. 43.
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that provide the best protection for a person against unreasonable and 
disproportionate searches. The discussed systems are accordingly compared. 
Moreover, two issues will be brought up to make an argument that the 
only plausible choice for the authority that shall have the competence to 
control searches is the independent and impartial judge, both in cases 
of preauthorized searches and those executed in the absence of search 
warrants. This will be done in the light of the position that the prosecution 
service has in each country, being associated either with the executive or 
the judiciary. Additionally, it will also be taken into account that the level 
of engagement of the prosecutor during a criminal investigation and the 
relationship between the prosecution and police are important factors in 
shaping the optimal model of a system that aims to guarantee efficient 
protection for the individual against unreasonable searches.
II.  RePoRts on RegulatIons RegaRdIng seaRch In chosen 
countRIes
1. seaRch In the unIted states of ameRIca
1.1. geneRal consIdeRatIons
Search in the USA is primarily regulated by the Fourth Amendment, 
which guarantees protection against unreasonable search and seizure of 
persons, places, and objects. Several issues are resolved by this regulation. 
First of all, the Fourth Amendment demonstrates a “strong preference 
for searches conducted pursuant to warrant”5. Even though warrantless 
searches are a daily routine for police officers throughout all US states, 
the prior judicial oversight of a coercive measure such as a search is 
considered a rule and not an exception6.
Secondly, the key feature of constitutional regulation is the 
connection that it creates between search (and seizure) and probable cause, 
5 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 236.
6 But see a critical observance of that in GRAY, David. Fourth Amendment 
Remedies as Rights: The Warrant Requirement. Boston University Law Re-
view, 2016, n. 96, pp. 433-436.
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making the latter a threshold that must be met if any coercive measure 
is to be imposed against an individual. What is understood by that term 
seems unclear and problematic. In Carroll v. United States it was stated 
that probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within 
[the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that [an offense has been or is being 
committed]”7. There is an obvious lack of agreement on the meaning of 
probable cause and on the level of certainty that should be reached in 
each case when a decision to search or seize is employed8. However, in 
federal law and in the majority of states it is adopted that what matters 
in determination of probable case is the “totality of circumstances”9. 
Finally, since the landmark decision in Katz v. United States, 
the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted as protecting persons 
whenever they have “reasonable expectation of privacy”10, overruling 
previous interpretation of the constitutional rule that provided for 
protection of places but not persons11. This covers all kind of searches 
(persons, objects, and places) by the Fourth Amendment requirements. 
Accordingly, it is also crucial to understand the difference that exists 
between search and the other unaffected form of interference with the 
privacy of a person, called stop and frisk. In concise terms, a police officer 
may stop a suspect on the street and frisk him if the police officer has 
just a reasonable suspicion. This requires a lower level of certainty than 
probable cause to believe that the person has committed, is committing, 
or is about to commit a crime or a reasonable belief that the person 
“may be armed and presently dangerous”12. And only if stop and frisk 
gives rise to probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed 
7 267 U.S. 132 (1925) 162. See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 
(1949).
8 Cf. COLB, Sherry F. Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical 
Versus Concrete Harms. Law and Contemporary Problems, n. 73, pp. 69-105, 
2010, p. 69.
9 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 214.
10 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 361.
11 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
12 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 27.
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a crime should the police be empowered to make a formal arrest and a 
full incident search of the person13. 
1.2. seaRch uPon a waRRant
The obligation to obtain a search warrant before executing a 
search, derived directly from the wording of the Fourth Amendment, 
is a rule both on federal and – since Mapp v. Ohio14 – on state level. The 
search warrant is issued upon the request of a police officer filed with 
a judge or magistrate in the form of an affidavit in which the applicant 
officially confirms facts as provided in the document and which contains 
detailed information regarding who or what should be searched and what 
in effect should be seized15. Each affidavit as a basis for issuing a search 
warrant is considered to be reliable because it contains information given 
by the officer under oath16. Therefore, the majority of searches with a 
warrant happen upon the request of police officers or other agents since 
they are primarily responsible for conducting the criminal investigation, 
with almost no involvement of prosecutors in the early stages of criminal 
proceedings. But the law also allows prosecutors to file requests with 
the judge if they deem it necessary. This usually happens when the 
prosecutor takes control of a criminal investigation after charges are 
filed with the court.
The responsibility of issuing search warrants rests ultimately 
with a judicial authority, i.e. a judge or magistrate. This is based on a 
premise that an impartial magistrate should be interposed between the 
citizen and the law enforcement agents whose job is the detection of 
crime “so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that 
privacy in order to enforce law”17. According to US standards it is required 
13 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 10. 
14 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15 SCHEB, John M; SCHEB, John M II. Criminal Procedure. Belmont: Wadsworth, 
1999, p. 50.
16 See DRESSLER, Joshua; THOMAS III, George. Criminal Procedure. Principles, 
Policies and Perspectives. St Paul: West Academic, 2017, p. 201.
17 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) 455.
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that the individual issuing a search warrant must not be in close relation 
with the criminal investigation authorities that will execute the order, 
so as to be able to evaluate from a distance and without pressure their 
requests18. This seems to be an approach broadly adopted throughout 
the US states. 
After the search warrant has been issued there is no subsequent 
judicial scrutiny over the search unless the evidence seized during the 
search is to be used during a trial when it is done in the form of a motion 
to suppress evidence in accordance with the exclusionary rule19. If the 
case does not reach the trial stage the system remains uninterested in 
the outcome of the search conducted upon the warrant other than the 
obligation of the officer to return the warrant if it was not executed within 
the prescribed term (usually 14 days)20. Only if the search resulted in the 
seizure of property or if the search was unlawful, may move to the court 
for the return of property21. This means that the system does not provide 
within the criminal process any remedy if the rights of an individual were 
infringed by an unlawful search upon a warrant that did not result in the 
suppression of evidence.
1.3. waRRantless seaRch
It is well understood in US law that “searches conducted outside 
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few 
specifically established and well delineated exceptions”22. This is usually 
called the “warrant requirement” that gives a strong preference for search 
18 Johnson v. United States 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
19 See on exclusionary rule Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and Mapp v. Ohio, 467 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
20 See on the federal level Rule 41 (f)(1)(D) Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.
21 See on the federal level Rule 41 (g) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
22 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 357.
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upon a warrant over searches without a warrant23. But, as was aptly 
observed by Judge Scalia concurring in California v. Acevedo, “the ‘warrant 
requirement’ had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically 
unrecognizable”24.
One such exception is exigent circumstances that arise from the 
need to conduct some searches in a dynamic manner. As it was held by 
the Supreme Court, “where there are exigent circumstances in which 
police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence 
of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial 
authorization”25. Such exigent circumstances normally arise in cases 
involving automobile searches justified by the possible loss of evidence 
due to the mobility of the vehicle26 and during the well-developed practice 
of searches incident to arrest27. Moreover, searches conducted upon the 
consent of the searched individual are also considered an exception to 
the warrant requirement28. This all leads to the situation where the police 
retain considerably wide discretion to decide who will be searched and 
whose house will be entered, and where warrantless search created as 
an exception has become a rule.
It is true that in every case in which police officers conduct a 
search without a warrant claiming that exigent circumstances arose, they 
must provide evidence that they didn’t have time to apply for the search 
warrant due to a suspicion that evidence may be hidden or destroyed29. But 
this will happen only when the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial the 
evidence obtained during such a search. If the case is disposed before the 
trial or dismissed there is no instrument in US law that allows for checking 
23 Dyson v. State, 122 Md.App. 413, 712 A.2d 573 (1998) (“the command of the 
Fourth Amendment to the American police officer and the American Prose-
cutor is simple: ‘You always have to get a warrant – UNLESS YOU CAN’T’”).
24 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) 583. 
25 Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973) 505.
26 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
27 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __ (2014). See also 
DRESSLER, Joshua; THOMAS III, George, op. cit., pp. 251-275.
28 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
29 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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the grounds for the search and the nature of the conducting of this measure. 
There is no confirmation of a warrantless search by any entity and there is 
no form of interlocutory appeal against an unreasonable search. 
Therefore, within the scope of criminal process the only effective 
remedy in cases of unlawful searches is an exclusionary rule. Theoretically, 
there are some other remedies available to the individual whose rights 
were infringed by the unlawful search, but they remain outside of the 
scope of criminal process. The affected individual may resort to civil 
procedure and sue the police officer who performed an unreasonable 
search. However, due to the doctrine of qualified immunity protecting 
government employees when they perform certain actions pertinent to 
their occupations, this is very unlikely to happen, since an officer may 
only be sued when no reasonable person would believe that the officer’s 
conduct was legal30. Another option is prosecution of an officer for illegal 
search and seizure, which also remains outside of the criminal proceedings 
in the case in which the illegal action occurred. All these remedies are 
reported as being rare and therefore cannot be considered as effective 
tools to fight the outcome of illegal searches.
2. seaRch In Italy 
2.1. geneRal consIdeRatIons
Protection of the individual against the search and seizure of 
a person (arrest) is regulated jointly in the Constitution of the Italian 
Republic31 as a form of interference with personal freedom (Article 13 of 
the Italian Constitution). In parallel to this regulation, search of a home 
and other premises is protected on the constitutional level as a form of 
30 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) 396 (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a 
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
officer on the scene”). See also Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) 214 (“an officer whose conduct is objectively un-
reasonable under Graham should find no shelter under a sequential qualified 
immunity test”).
31 La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana of 27 December 1947 [hereinafter 
Italian Constitution].
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interference with privacy (Article 14 of the Italian Constitution). The 
guarantees prescribed for safeguarding personal freedom (e.g. regarding 
the authority responsible for issuing search orders) are applicable to 
other forms of interference with privacy according to Article 14 (2) of 
the Italian Constitution. Further provisions provide for the protection of 
the secrecy of correspondence (Article 15 of the Italian Constitution).
Accordingly, the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure32 provides 
for the search of a person (perquisizione personale – Article 249 (1) 
CCP-Italy), search of premises (perquisizione locale – Article 250 CCP), 
and, introduced in 2008, search of computers and electronic systems 
(perquisizione informatica – Article 247 (1bis) CCP-Italy)33. All searches 
may only be conducted if there are reasonable grounds to believe (fondato 
motive di ritenere) that objects used to commit an offence or related to 
an offence are possessed by the person who is to be searched or are 
located in a place that is to be searched as well as that the accused who 
must be arrested remains in such place (Article 247 (1) CCP-Italy). This 
vague prerequisite (i.e. “reasonable grounds”) allows for a search to 
be conducted if it is reasonable to predict that a search will be fruitful, 
and even if at the end of the search it turns out that this suspicion was 
groundless (no objects were found) it does not necessarily undermine 
the legality of the search34.
2.2. seaRches uPon a waRRant
Neither the constitution nor the CCP-Italy directly demands that 
the judge (court) issues search warrants. Instead Article 13 of the Italian 
32 Codice di Procedura Penale, Decreto del presidente della Repubblica, 22 Sep-
tember 1988, no. 447 [hereinafter CCP-Italy].
33 The law also provides for inspections (ispezioni) aimed at ascertaining the 
traces or other effects of the crime on persons, places, and objects, including 
computer and telecommunication systems (see on that difference LASAGNI, 
Giulia. Tackling phone searches in Italy and the United States: Proposals for 
a technological rethinking of procedural rights and freedoms. New Journal of 
European Criminal Law, n. 9, pp. 386-401, 2018, p. 393, footnote 27).
34 CAIANIELLO, Michele. Increasing Discretionary Prosecutor’s Powers: The Piv-
otal Role of the Italian Prosecutor in the Pretrial Investigation Phase. Oxford: 
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2016, p. 6.
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Constitution pronounces that the decision to impose measures infringing 
rights of individuals is vested in the hands of the authority prescribed 
more broadly as “judicial authority” (l’autorità giudiciaria). However, the 
constitution does not explain what is understood by this term, leaving this 
for further interpretation. Similarly, Article 247 (3) CCP-Italy provides 
vaguely that the “judicial authority” shall be competent to conduct a search 
or to order police to conduct it. The established understanding in Italian 
constitutional law is that the term “judicial authority” refers equally to 
the judge and the prosecutor35. But this expression has been interpreted 
differently in the CCP-Italy, with alternative reference to a judge or to the 
prosecutor36. In the case of searches it has been understood that during 
a criminal investigation the responsibility for issuing a warrant remains 
in the hands of the prosecutors37. 
This might be somewhat surprising since the Italian criminal 
procedure, heavily reformed in 1988 in a direction leaning towards 
the adversarial system of criminal procedure, managed to establish the 
judge for the preliminary investigation (GIP – giudice per le indagini 
preliminari) with the aim of controlling the work of the public prosecutor 
and guaranteeing the rights of the person being investigated (Article 
328 CCP-Italy). The GIP, being equipped with competences relating 
to restriction of personal freedom if this proves necessary during the 
investigation and ordering interception, is at the same time not eligible 
to intervene with decisions to conduct a search. This is regardless of 
the fact that the search as presented above on the constitutional level is 
clearly seen as a form of deprivation of rights of an individual.
The prosecutorial search order must always contain reasons 
for such a decision (Article 247 (2) CCP-Italy). This becomes a basis 
for subsequent judicial review of such an order, since the prosecutorial 
search warrant may be subjected to the interlocutory appeal received 
and decided by the judge. This is, however, only true for such searches 
35 CAIANIELLO, Michele. Increasing Discretionary Prosecutor’s Powers…, op. 
cit., p. 4.
36 LASAGNI, Giulia, op. cit., p. 395.
37 PERRODET, Antoinette. The Italian System. En: DELMAS-MARTY, Mireille; 
SPENCER, John R (eds.). European Criminal Procedures. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002, p. 377.
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that resulted in seizure of property. The accused, the person from whom 
objects have been seized, and the person who would be entitled to their 
restitution may submit a request for re-examination of the seizure, which 
includes the grounds for search and seizure (Article 257 (1) CCP-Italy) in 
accordance with the “re-examination” procedure as designed for pretrial 
measures (Article 324 CCP-Italy)38. This means that searches ordered by 
the prosecutor that resulted with no seizure simply cannot be appealed 
and reviewed by the judge (court). Nevertheless, it is reported that even 
in cases when during the search some objects were seized, the criteria 
provided by law are so vague that it is very complicated for the defense 
to show at the appeal stage that the warrant was invalid or ill founded39.
2.3. waRRantless seaRches
The rule that the search should be conducted upon the 
prosecutorial order is overshadowed in practice by the police conducting 
searches without an order. The police may search a person’s body 
or premises in each case where there are exigent circumstances and 
when they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person is hiding 
objects or traces related to the offence on his body that can be lost or 
destroyed or that such objects or traces are in a certain place or that 
the suspected person or the escapee is in such a place (Article 352 (1) 
CCP)40. The exigent circumstances are understood as an urgent situation 
that happens in the case of a flagrant crime or in the case of an escape. 
In every case a warrantless search undertaken by the police is subject 
to confirmation by the prosecutor41. The police have only 48 hours to 
inform a prosecutor that such a search has been conducted and the 
prosecutor has an additional 48 hours to confirm it (Article 352 (4) 
38 CAIANIELLO, Michele. Increasing Discretionary Prosecutor’s Powers…, op. 
cit., p. 5.
39 CAIANIELLO, Michele. Increasing Discretionary Prosecutor’s Powers…, op. 
cit., p. 5.
40 This also applies to searches of computer and electronic systems according to 
Article 352 (1bis) CCP.
41 DI AMATO, Astolfo. Criminal Law in Italy. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2013, p. 181.
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CCP). This happens regardless of whether anything was found through 
such search. Moreover, in accordance with Article 257 (1) CCP-Italy, 
the search can be appealed, but, as was discussed above, again only in 
cases where a seizure took place during the search.
3. seaRch In Poland
3.1. geneRal consIdeRatIons
In Polish law the search (przeszukanie) is understood as a form 
of interference with the rights of the individual, which are guaranteed on 
a constitutional level42. The searching of persons, objects, and premises 
is primarily conflicting with a right to protection of private and family 
life expressed in Article 47 of the Polish Constitution43. But in many 
instances the search is also seen as interference with the principle of 
the inviolability of the home, protected under Article 50 of the Polish 
Constitution and a search of a person, apart from interfering with one’s 
privacy, also intrudes on personal inviolability, protected under Article 
41(1) of the Polish Constitution44. Surprisingly, though setting a high 
standard for the protection of the rights of the individual, the Polish 
Constitution remains absolutely silent when it comes to determining the 
authority that retains the power to order a search in all of these provisions.
The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure45 regulates searches in 
Chapter 25, entitled “Seizure of Things and Searches”. Article 219 CCP-
42 See SKORUPKA, Jerzy. Konstytucyjne i konwencyjne granice przeszukania w 
postępowaniu karnym (cz. I). Palestra, v. 9-10, 2007, p. 92 and GROCHOWS-
KI, Jacek. Przeszukanie w procesie karnym jako instytucja wyznaczająca 
granice konstytucyjnych praw osobistych. Problemy Prawa Karnego n. 17, 
1991, p. 126.
43 Konstytucja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej of 2nd April 1997 (Dz. U. z 1997 r., Nr 78, 
poz. 483) [hereinafter: Constitution of Poland].
44 KREMENS, Karolina. The limits of interference with the right to privacy and 
property in criminal proceedings. En: SKORUPKA, Jerzy (ed.). The model of 
acceptable interference with the rights and freedoms of an individual in criminal 
process. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2019, p. 585.
45 Kodeks postępowania karnego, ustawa 6 June 1997 (Dz.U. 2017, poz. 1904) 
[hereinafter: CCP-Poland].
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Poland does not provide a definition of search. It describes the grounds 
to search premises and other locations (§ 1) as well as persons, persons’ 
apparel, and personal effects (§ 2). Accordingly, scholars distinguish 
between the search of premises, which may include a vehicle, and that 
of a person, which may include a person’s apparel and their belongings. 
However, the CCP does not limit who exactly can be searched. Therefore, 
a search may target a suspect but also other persons who have no formal 
connection with the proceedings, with no limitations to it.
In each case the search may be conducted only whenever there 
is “reasonable basis to believe” (uzasadnione podstawy do przypuszczenia) 
that a suspected person is in a place that is subjected to search (Article 
219 § 1 CCP-Poland). The same applies to the things that can be used 
as evidence or that must be seized (e.g. drugs). Unfortunately, case law 
provides no guidance on how to interpret the “reasonable basis to believe” 
requirement. In particular, it is unclear whether this requirement sets a 
standard of prima facie obviousness46. At the same time Article 219 § 1 
CCP-Poland narrows down the scope of the search through its provision 
that the search may only be conducted if there is a need to detect or detain 
or ensure the compulsory appearance of a suspect or to detect objects 
that might serve as evidence in a case or that are subject to sequestration 
in criminal proceedings.
3.2. seaRches uPon a waRRant
The CCP provides for a preference of searches upon a warrant. 
Therefore, as a rule searches in Poland should happen primarily upon 
a warrant and only exigent circumstances may justify conducting a 
search without a warrant (Article 220 § 3 CCP-Poland). More precisely, 
it is provided that a search shall be conducted by a prosecutor herself 
or, upon her decision, by the police or another agency authorized to 
conduct criminal investigation (e.g. the Internal Security Agency or 
Border Security). If a search is not conducted by the prosecutor herself 
the officer willing to conduct the search should obtain a prosecutorial 
46 KOPER, Radosław. Przeszukanie w wypadkach niecierpiących zwłoki. Proku-
ratura i Prawo, n. 11–12, 2014, p. 19. 
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search warrant prior to the search47. The power to issue a search warrant 
during an investigation ultimately rests with the prosecutor (Article 220 
§ 1 CCP-Poland). The CCP does not consider either a judge or any other 
authority as being competent to issue search warrants at this stage of 
criminal proceedings48. 
Since the Polish Constitution lacks provisions prescribing the 
authority competent to issue search warrants and does not demand 
that it should be a judge, the CCP seems in compliance with the legal 
standard as set on the constitutional level. But the problem of whether such 
regulation, or rather lack of it, is sufficient has been recently discussed 
in Polish legal literature. As a result, scholars have called for a change to 
this situation, claiming that the level of engagement of the prosecutor in 
the course of a criminal investigation makes him too prejudiced to make 
an independent evaluation of the need to conduct a search49.
Such views have been expressed regardless of the mechanism 
available in Polish law that provides for post-factum judicial revision 
of prosecutorial search warrants. The person whose rights have been 
infringed by the issuance of a prosecutorial search warrant may file 
an interlocutory appeal with the court (Article 236 § 1 CCP-Poland). 
In fact this provision has a much broader character, also allowing 
for judicial scrutiny in all cases involving seizure of things, and is 
available to every person whose rights have been infringed. General 
rules of filing an interlocutory appeal apply accordingly (Article 465 
§ 2 CCP-Poland). 
47 NOWAK, Celina; STEINBORN, Sławomir. Poland. En: LIGETI, Katalin (eds.). 
Toward a Prosecutor of the European Union, Volume 1: A Comparative Analysis. 
London: Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 519.
48 It must be noted, however, that Polish law also provides for the possibility to 
conduct the search during the trial stage of criminal proceedings. However, 
in such cases, the power to issue a search warrant rests only with the court 
that holds the trial (Article 220 § 1 CCP-Poland). 
49 See STEINBORN, Sławomir. Problem organu uprawnionego do stosowania 
przeszukania w toku procesu karnego w świetle unormowań konstytucy-
jnych i prawnomiędzynarodowych. Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze, n. 19, 2008, p. 
375; SKORUPKA, Jerzy. Konstytucyjne i konwencyjne granice przeszukania 
w postępowaniu karnym (cz. II). Palestra, n. 11-12, 2007, , p. 52.
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3.3. waRRantless seaRches
Nevertheless, the obvious need to conduct searches in exigent 
circumstances forced lawmakers to allow the police to conduct a search 
without a warrant. The competence to conduct the search in the case 
of exigent circumstances applies not only to police but also to all other 
agencies that are allowed to conduct criminal investigations. This is only 
allowed when there is an “urgent need” to conduct a search and there is 
no possibility to obtain a prosecutorial search warrant (Article 220 § 3 
CCP-Poland). The term “exigent circumstances” justifying warrantless 
searches is considered as unclear and imprecise50. Surprisingly the case 
law does not provide any help in this matter. But in literature it is accepted 
that exigent circumstances justifying warrantless search exist when 
commencing an investigative action with a delay due to time lost while 
obtaining a prosecutorial warrant or lack of action would result in the loss, 
distortion, or destruction of evidence51. Existence of these circumstances 
must be evaluated in the light of the circumstances that existed when the 
search was conducted and not as seen at the time when being evaluated by 
the judge52. Among these circumstances are the need to act immediately, 
the lack of possibility to obtain a warrant, but also that general grounds to 
conduct a search upon a warrant enlisted in Article 219 § 1 CCP-Poland 
took place, i.e. that the “reasonable basis to believe” requirement has 
been established before undertaking a search in this dynamic situation.
In cases when the search is conducted without a warrant, the 
police, immediately upon the conclusion of the search, must in every case 
apply to the prosecutor for confirmation of a conducted warrantless search 
(Article 220 § 3 CCP-Poland). Issuing the confirmation is obligatory in 
every case and consequences of not doing so are grave. If the search is not 
confirmed within seven days of the day it took place, the objects seized 
during the search must immediately be returned to the owner (Article 
230 § 1 CCP-Poland). In accordance with Article 236 § 1 CCP-Poland, 
50 SAKOWICZ, Andrzej. Poszanowanie życia prywatnego w postępowaniu 
karnym. Jurysta, n. 6, 2000, p. 21.
51 KOPER, Radosław, op. cit., pp. 20-21 and literature cited in footnote 14.
52 SKORUPKA, Jerzy. Komentarz do art. 220 k.p.k. En: SKORUPKA, Jerzy (ed.), 
Kodeks postępowania karnego. Komentarz. Warszawa: CH Beck, 2018, p. 516.
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the decision confirming a warrantless search as well as the search itself 
is subjected to an interlocutory appeal. All general rules regarding 
interlocutory appeals apply.
4. seaRch In geRmany
4.1. geneRal consIdeRatIons
Search (Durchsuchung) is a typical coercive measure yet must 
also be considered as an important investigative tool. Any person that is 
suspected of a crime may be subject to a search that can include the search 
of their body, property, or premises (including their home) (§ 102 CCP-
Germany). The threshold for a search is quite low, i.e. the search can be 
conducted for the purpose of arresting the suspect, as well as in cases where 
it may be presumed that the search will lead to the discovery of evidence. 
But upon additional prerequisites the search may also be conducted against 
persons other than the suspect. This type of search is permissible only for 
the purpose of arrest of a suspect or to follow up the traces of a criminal 
offence or to seize certain objects, and only if certain facts support the 
conclusion that the person, trace, or object sought is located on the premises 
to be searched (§ 103 (1) CCP-Germany first sentence)53.
The German Constitution (Grundgesetz)54 provides for the 
protection of the rights of individuals that could be infringed by the 
search in distinct provisions. The inviolability of a person together with 
the right to personal integrity is provided in Article 2 (2) of the German 
Constitution, which also makes an assurance that such rights may be 
interfered with only pursuant to the law. Provisions of Article 11 of the 
German Constitution refer to protection of the right to privacy with regard 
53 These restrictions do not apply to multiple rooms in a building in cases of a 
number of serious crimes against national security and terrorism, as long as 
there is well-founded reason to believe that the suspect is hiding somewhere 
in the building (§ 103 (1) CCP-Germany second sentence), or if the room is 
one in which the suspect either was apprehended or which he entered while 
being pursued (§ 103 (2) CCP-Germany).
54 Grundgesetz of 23 May 1949 (I BGBl 1949, 1) [hereinafter: German 
Constitution].
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to correspondence, post, and telecommunications. Finally, the right to 
privacy of an individual within his premises is protected by Article 13 (1) 
of the German Constitution, which provides for the inviolability of the 
home. This right is furthermore protected by the provision of Article 13 
(2) of the German Constitution that vests the right to order the search in 
the hands of the judge and only in exigent circumstances can the search 
be ordered by another authority designated by law. Following subsections 
of the same article (sec. 3-7) adopt an even higher standard for protection 
of privacy in cases of the use of secret surveillance.
4.2. seaRch uPon a waRRant
Taking into account the clear and straightforward considerations 
of the German Constitution, the CCP-Germany provides that searches 
may be ordered only by a judge (§ 105 (1) CCP-Germany). This function 
will be served during a criminal investigation by a special figure called 
“judge of the investigation” (Ermittlungsrichter). This person does not 
hold the position of an investigative judge as known from the French 
system and is not a proactive investigatory official but takes action only 
upon the request of the prosecutor. Such requests are made in situations 
when specific investigative acts are to be performed, e.g. the interrogation 
of witnesses or suspects (§ 162 (1) CCP-Germany)55.
This is a result of a general assumption that only a judge can 
impose a measure that interferes with the rights and liberties of an 
individual56. However the study shows that judicial scrutiny over searches 
does not prevent unnecessary searches since search warrants are easily 
granted when compared to arrest warrants57. 
55 WEIGEND, Thomas. Germany. En: Ligeti K (ed.). Toward a Prosecutor of the 
European Union, Volume 1: A Comparative Analysis. London: Hart Publish-
ing, 2013, p. 267.
56 WEIGEND, Thomas; SALDITT, Franz. The Investigative Stage of the Crimi-
nal Process in Germany. En: CAPE, Ed; HODGSON, Jacqueline; PRAKKEN, 
Ties; SPRONKEN, Taru (eds.). Suspects in Europe. Antwerpen: Intersentia, 
2007, p. 85.
57 TRENDAFILOVA, Ekaterina; RÓTH, Werner. Report on the Public Prosecution 
Service in Germany. En: Promoting Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence 
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In any case an individual affected by the search may file an 
interlocutory appeal with a court (Beschwerde) according to general 
rules that provide for the right to double check decisions made during 
preliminary investigation as well as during later stages of criminal 
proceedings (§ 304 (1) CCP-Germany). This remedy is available to 
all affected by the search and not only to the suspect (§ 304 (2) CCP-
Germany). Therefore, German law provides not only for prior judicial 
scrutiny of the decision to search but, upon the request of an individual, 
gives an opportunity for later consideration of the grounds of a search. 
4.3. waRRantless seaRches 
Even though the law provides for the preference of searches upon 
a warrant preauthorized by a judge, it is reported that in the great majority 
of cases in which exigent circumstances exist, the search may happen 
without a warrant58. The “other authority”, as prescribed by the German 
Constitution, capable of ordering a search in exigent circumstances is 
primarily the prosecutor (§ 105 (1) CCP-Germany). But the same power 
is also further extended to a big group of police officers acting on behalf of 
the prosecutor59. This group of so-called investigative officers or auxiliary 
prosecutors (Ermittlungspersonen) functions according to Article 152 (1) 
of the Court Organization Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) and is obliged 
to carry out prosecutorial orders. It generally has the same powers as the 
prosecutors in carrying out investigations, including the power to order 
a search in cases of exigent circumstances even regarding a person other 
than the suspect (§ 105 (1) CCP-Germany first sentence)60. The only 
and Effectiveness. Sofia: Open Society Institute Sofia, 2008, p. 234.
58 KUHNE, Heinz-Heinrich. Germany. En: VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Christine 
(ed.). Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community. London: But-
terworths, 1993, p. 151 (“[…] a search warrant issued by a judge has become 
in fact rather exceptional whereas the practice of police and prosecutor 
searching on their own has become the rule”).
59 FRASE, Richard; WEIGEND, Thomas. German Criminal Justice as a Guide 
to American Law Reform. Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review, n. 18, 1995, p. 323.
60 Ibidem., p. 323. 
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exception is searches conducted for the purpose of arresting a person 
strongly suspected of certain grave crimes (§ 89a, § 129a and § 129b 
StGB), e.g. forming national and international terrorist organizations. In 
these cases a search of private and other premises conducted in a building 
in which it may be assumed that the suspect is located may be in exigent 
circumstances ordered only by the prosecutor (§ 105 (1) CCP-Germany 
second sentence). 
In German literature exigent circumstances (Gefahr im Verzug) 
are interpreted in a narrow way and are understood as a situation in 
which the search would become futile if the police officer would have 
to involve the prosecutor, who would then in turn have to apply to a 
judge for a search warrant. But in practice searches are reported to be 
frequently conducted without a judicial order also due to the fact that 
Gefahr im Verzug has been interpreted quite broadly61. Recently, however, 
a tendency to limit this broad approach has become more visible. The 
Federal Constitutional Court has emphasized the exceptional character 
of searches without judicial authorization and has required, in each 
case, information documenting the need to act immediately as well as 
the moment when the information reached the police and the efforts 
made to contact a judge62. On other occasions the Court has stressed 
the need to institute judicial emergency services to facilitate contact 
between the police officers needing to conduct a search and the judge 
of the investigation63.
Searches that take place in exigent circumstances without a 
judicial search warrant must be subsequently confirmed by the court64. 
Every person that such a search concerns can request subsequent judicial 
review of its legitimacy (§ 98 (2) CCP second sentence) and must be 
informed of the right to do so (§ 98 (2) CCP fifth sentence). In some 
61 WEIGEND, Thomas. Germany, op. cit., p. 286 footnote 214.
62 103 BVerfGE 142 (2000).
63 SIEGISMUND, Eberhard. The Public Prosecution Office in Germany: Legal 
Status, Function and Organization. Effective Administration of the Police and 
the Prosecution in Criminal Justice. The 120th International Senior Seminar, 
2003. Available at: <https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No60/
No60_10VE_Siegismund2.pdf>. Access on: 3 September 2020, p. 62.
64 TRENDAFILOVA, Ekaterina; RÓTH, Werner, op. cit., p. 233.
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cases, e.g. when neither a person concerned nor an adult was present 
during a search that resulted in the seizure of things, the request for 
judicial confirmation of such a search must be submitted to court within 
three days by the official conducting a search without a warrant (§ 98 
(2) CCP first sentence). Additionally, those affected by the warrantless 
search may file an interlocutory appeal with a judge questioning the 
necessity and lawfulness of the search65. The power to move for such a 
remedy comes from the same regulation as the interlocutory appeal in the 
case of a search upon a warrant (§ 304 CCP-Germany). For many years 
German law did not provide for exclusion of evidence on such basis66. 
III. comPaRIsons and obseRvatIons
1. states’ RegulatIons comPaRed
The question of who shall be responsible to limit the arbitrariness 
of the government in cases involving searches of people, objects, and 
places remains crucial to providing sufficient protection of the rights of 
individuals. It is unquestionable that between the police officer wanting to 
conduct the search and the individual that such a search will be targeted 
at shall stand a decision maker in a capacity of a gatekeeper. This official 
shall be able to screen applications for search warrants and rule out the 
unjustified and unreasonable searches. But taking into account the number 
of warrantless searches that take place daily in all countries, even more 
striking remains the question of control over warrantless searches and 
the authority capable of exercising the control. The comparative research 
gives a full range of possible choices to that matter.
On the constitutional level it remains unclear between the 
analyzed countries what kind of official shall be considered as the authority 
responsible to issue search warrants. Neither the US nor Poland provides 
for constitutional regulation regarding officials authorized to order a 
65 Ibidem., p. 233.
66 BRADLEY, Craig. The Exclusionary Rule in Germany. Harvard Law Review, n. 
96, 1983, p. 1032.
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search in typical situations, leaving it for interpretation on the judicial 
(US) or normative (Poland) levels. On the other hand, in Germany the 
constitution clearly states that it should be a judge (Richter) that remains 
the only authority to issue search warrants. But this refers solely to the 
search of premises, while personal inviolability seems not to be protected 
in a similar way, at least as provided in Article 2 (2) of the German 
Constitution only guaranteeing as much as these rights (inviolability and 
physical integrity) may be interfered only pursuant by law. In the case of 
Italy, the constitution is less specific, using a more general and undefined 
expression of “judicial authority” (l’autorità giudiciaria). However, this 
shall be understood as either judge or prosecutor due to the position 
that the prosecutor traditionally retains in Italy. The same rules are also 
applicable to the search of premises.
But the lack of constitutional provisions in the US pinning down 
the authority eligible to issue search warrants does not stop American 
courts from determining that the only official authorized to order a search 
is a judge (magistrate), as confirmed in Mapp v. Ohio67. Surprisingly, 
Germany, the system traditionally perceived as the most inquisitorial, 
remains closest to the American idea of who should retain the power 
to order a search. German law provides for judicial search orders as a 
strict rule. At the same time, in Poland issuing a search warrant during a 
criminal investigation remains solely the responsibility of the prosecutor. 
At that stage of the criminal process, even if there were enough time 
to apply to a judge for a search warrant, the judge is legally excluded 
from doing so. Finally, in Italy, due to the interpretation that accepts 
prosecutors as “judicial authority”, the prosecutor retains full power to 
issue search warrants. 
In analyzing the Italian case, it seems surprising that the 
competence to issue a search warrant was vested in prosecutorial hands. 
Under the old Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1930, the power to 
order and conduct searches was assigned to the investigating judge (giudice 
istruttore)68, a famous inquisitorial figure abandoned in the majority 
67 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
68 ILLUMINATI, Giulio. The Frustrated Turn…, op. cit., p. 567.
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of continental countries69 and in 1988 in Italy. Thus, the new code of 
1988 replaced the investigating judge with a new authority, creating the 
preliminary investigation judge with the main task of protecting the rights 
of those under investigation70. This authority has the power, upon request 
of the prosecutor, to adopt measures restricting the personal freedom of 
the accused during the preliminary investigation (e.g. pretrial detention) 
or to restrict their privacy, e.g. by authorizing a wiretap on a telephone71. 
Notwithstanding the adopted interpretation of the “judicial authority” 
equating judge and prosecutor, which formally allows the latter to issue 
search warrants, it was possible to adopt another resolution in which 
the preliminary investigation judge instead of the prosecutor would, in 
addition to authorizing arrest and detention, also preauthorize search 
warrants. It is worth noting that in the case of Poland, the situation 
is quite similar, granting power to issue some coercive measures to a 
judge (e.g. arrest and wiretaps) and some others like a search warrant 
to a prosecutor. However, the difference is in the detail – in Poland the 
prosecutor is not equated with a judge.
In light of the above, both the US and Germany seem to provide 
a higher standard of protection for the individual than do Poland and 
Italy. This standard may even seem quite similar, since in both countries 
only a judge may preauthorize a search. But one has to acknowledge 
another step in providing protection of privacy in the cases of all three 
examined continental states. They offer a right to file a motion (revision, 
interlocutory appeal) to verify the lawfulness of a search even in cases 
where the search was preauthorized. This is seen as an immediate remedy 
for an individual who believes that their rights were infringed by the search.
The US does not provide for any immediate remedy with regard 
to verification of the lawfulness of a search conducted upon a warrant. 
This may only be done when a case reaches a trial stage or, to a different 
69 Almost the sole exceptions that still use this figure are France and Belgium. 
Nevertheless, many scholars with common law roots believe that this is one 
of the typical elements of the Continental system.
70 GRANDE, Elisabetta. Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance. 
American Journal of Comparative Law, n. 48, 2000, p. 233.
71 FABRI, Marco. Criminal Procedure and Public Prosecution Reform in Italy: A 
Flash Back. International Journal for Court Administration, n. 10, 2008, p. 10.
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extent, when a person demands the return of property. In the cases of 
Poland and Germany this remedy is available to every person regardless of 
an effect of such search to allow subsequent evaluation of the lawfulness or 
necessity of such a search. Italy gives a similar right to move to judgment 
for verification of a search but only in cases where the search resulted 
in the seizure of things.
At this point it is worth bringing up the position of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which provides for a minimum standard 
for protection of the rights of an individual among European countries 
members of the Council of Europe72. It is true that when it comes to search 
the ECtHR focuses mainly on the conduct of such measure in “accordance 
with law”73, whether the interference furthers a legitimate aim,74 and 
if is “necessary in a democratic society”75. The ECHR is silent when it 
comes to establishing the organ authorized to issue search warrants, but 
this does not preclude the ECtHR from demanding independent judicial 
supervision over searches76. However, the Court noted in Smirnov v. Russia 
that the absence of a prior judicial warrant may be counterbalanced by 
the availability of a post-factum judicial review77. On the other occasion in 
Heino v. Finland the ECtHR sustained that position, confirming that either 
prior or post judicial scrutiny over the decision to search is acceptable as a 
proper standard of protection78. This would mean that the judicial control 
72 In the case of a search this is primarily a right to privacy as protected by 
Article 8 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms 
[ECHR].
73 Halford v. The United Kingdom, no. 20605/92, 25 June 1997.
74 Mozer v. The Republic of Moldova and Russia, no. 11138/10, 23 February 2016, 
§ 194 (the ECtHR established that it is the responsibility of the government 
to demonstrate that the interference pursued a legitimate aim).
75 See among others Buck v. Germany, no. 41604/98, 28 April 2005 and Ratush-
na v. Ukraine, no. 17318/06, 2 December 2010.
76 Sallinen and Others v. Finland, no. 50882/99, 27 September 2005, § 89.
77 Smirnov v. Russia, no. 71362/01, 7 June 2007, § 45. 
78 Heino v. Finland, no. 56720/09, 15 February 2011, § 46 (“[E]ven if there 
could be said to be a general legal basis for the impugned measures in Finnish 
law, that law does not provide sufficient judicial safeguards either before the 
granting of a search warrant or after the search. The applicant was thus de-
prived of the minimum degree of protection to which she was entitled under 
the rule of law in a democratic society”).
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over search warrants issued by a non-judicial authority (a prosecutor in 
the cases of Italy and Poland) is acceptable79. But the ECtHR makes it 
clear that the mere fact of the availability of such a remedy will not in 
itself necessarily amount to a sufficient safeguard against abuse. Such 
remedy must be considered as effective and this is assessed in the light 
of the specific circumstances of every case80. 
Accordingly, Germany seems to be in full compliance with the 
standard as presented above. There is not only a prior judicial authorization 
of a search but also a remedy available to affected individuals that gives 
a second chance for a judicial review of the conducted measure. This 
interlocutory appeal depends on the will of the affected individual to 
go to a judge for such a resolution. In the case of Poland the revision by 
the judicial authority of a measure preauthorized by a prosecutor is also 
triggered upon a request of the individual. This raises the question of 
whether such a revision is effective and safeguards against possible abuse 
if only the action of the individual makes the revision possible. This is 
particularly troublesome when one takes into consideration that there 
is a seven-day time limit for the filing of an interlocutory appeal. This is 
also an issue in the case of Germany, but the obligatory preauthorization 
of the search makes a significant difference here.
To that extent the most problematic is the case of Italy. Here the 
judicial post-factum revision of a search upon a warrant issued by the 
prosecutor is only available in cases where the search resulted in seizure. 
This lack of judicial scrutiny in no-seizure cases was criticized by the 
ECtHR in the recent case Brazzi v. Italy81. The case concerned Marco 
Brazzi, an Italian and German national whose Italian house was searched 
in 2010 upon a warrant issued by the prosecutor of Mantua in connection 
with the ongoing criminal investigation involving alleged tax evasion by 
Brazzi. The ECtHR noted that the prosecutorial decision to authorize a 
search lacked any prior judicial oversight, which would not be an issue 
if it was counterbalanced by a subsequent judicial review, after the act, 
79 Note that this applies to the same extent to the judicial reviews of warrantless 
searches.
80 Geraschenko v. Ukraine, no. 20602/05, 7 November 2013, § 130.
81 Brazzi v. Italy, no. 57278/11, 27 September 2018.
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as to the lawfulness and necessity of the measure. In the discussed case 
this however did not take place82. Therefore, since there was neither prior 
judicial oversight nor any effective ex post facto review of the impugned 
investigative measure, the ECtHR found that Italian law did not provide 
sufficient safeguards against the risk of abuse of power by the authorities 
conducting the criminal investigation and ruled the violation of Article 8 
of the ECHR83. This seems in line with the previous judgment delivered 
in Modestou v. Greece84, concerning the search of a Cypriot national living 
in Greece whose house was searched upon a prosecutorial order, also 
without a prior or retrospective judicial review. 
In all four examined countries it is reported that regardless of the 
rule that calls for preauthorization of a search in the form of a warrant, 
warrantless searches have become the norm, moving searches upon a 
warrant to a box with one name: exception. Therefore, the police and 
other agencies frequently conduct warrantless searches under a similar 
regime if they can prove that exigent circumstances have occurred. What 
is understood by exigent circumstances may vary from country to country 
but generally it shall be understood as a necessity to act immediately due 
to the possibility of losing evidence combined with the lack of opportunity 
to move for preauthorization of such a search. 
However, this is where the similarities end. It is surprising how 
differently countries deal with the outcome of such searches and whether 
they provide an immediate opportunity to verify them. While US does not 
provide for any post-factum authorization of warrantless searches either 
by the prosecutor or a judge, all three continental countries demand it, 
differing only along the line of what authority should do so. Italy and 
Poland consider the prosecutor eligible for the post-authorization as well, 
82 In fact it was argued that at some point the judge for preliminary investigation 
did eventually review the case, confirming the discontinuation of the prelim-
inary investigation (which according to Article 408 CCP-Italy is obligatory in 
each case when the prosecutor believes that the charge is groundless).
83 The ECtHR decided similarly in the case Modestou v. Greece, no. 51693/13, 
16 March 2017, concerning a Cypriot national living in Greece whose house 
was searched upon a prosecutorial order also without either a prior or retro-
spective judicial review.
84 Modestou v. Greece, no. 51693/13, 16 March 2017.
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and Germany resorts in this case to the judge too. Most importantly, 
however, all immediate remedies that the law provides in cases of a search 
upon a warrant discussed above also apply in cases of warrantless searches. 
Therefore, in the cases of Germany, Italy, and Poland the warrantless search 
is not only subsequently confirmed but is also subjected to judicial scrutiny 
upon the request of the individual whose rights were allegedly infringed, 
although in the case of Italy only when the search resulted with the seizure.
2. non-elIgIbIlIty of PRosecutoR to authoRIze seaRches
The presented diversity of choices brings an obvious question 
of whether it is acceptable that the prosecutor may authorize searches 
conducted both with and without a warrant. This in fact should be 
rephrased to whether there are some circumstances under which the 
prosecutor could be considered as an authority allowed to authorize 
searches without prior or subsequent judicial scrutiny. 
The US case law seems to have clear and convincing arguments 
to that matter. The good hand of US case law relating to search focuses 
on features of an official that would be allowed to make a decision to 
search, connecting it with a notion of “neutral and detached magistrate”. 
This requirement was set 70 years ago when the Supreme Court stated 
that “[t]he point of the Fourth Amendment which often is not grasped 
by zealous officers is not that it denies law enforcement the support of 
the usual inferences reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection 
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”85 The Supreme 
Court took some effort to explain it further. Interestingly, the “neutral 
and detached magistrate” does not necessarily have to be a lawyer. What 
is required from the issuing authority is neutrality and detachment from 
the case as well as capability to determine the existence of probable 
cause for the requested search86. On the other occasion the US Supreme 
85 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), para. 13-14.
86 Shadwick v. City of Tampa 407 U.S. 345 (1972), 350.
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Court sustained the position that the relation of the decision maker with 
the government is crucial in the evaluation of his eligibility to order 
an intrusion into privacy. It was observed that prosecutors associated 
with the executive have a duty and responsibility to enforce the laws, 
investigate, and prosecute and therefore, “should not be the sole judges 
of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their 
tasks” since “unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily 
to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential 
invasions of privacy […]”87. 
From the case law presented above one can get the impression that 
perhaps what makes the prosecutor incapable of making such decisions 
like intrusion into privacy is his relation with the executive. Indeed, in the 
American system it raises almost no question that the prosecutor is seen 
as a part of the executive branch88. In the view of the US Supreme Court, 
“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to 
decide whether to prosecute a case”89. Therefore, in a system that makes 
a prosecutor a part of the executive branch an impartial referee seems 
necessary to resolve whether an intrusion in such rights of an individual 
as privacy is justified. This would mean that in countries where the 
prosecution service is associated with the judiciary the problem should 
disappear. But this is not the case.
In Germany the prosecutor is seen as a neutral, objective official 
who holds a quasi-judicial role in fact-finding, whose duty during a criminal 
investigation is to examine the facts regardless of whether or not they 
support the initial suspicion90. The prosecutor is obliged to investigate not 
only incriminating evidence but to look for evidence that might be of an 
exculpatory nature as well (Article 160 (2) CCP-Germany). Therefore, 
prosecutors are seen as “guardians of the law” (Wächter der Gesetzes) 
87 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), para. 317.
88 GRAMCKOW, Heike. Prosecutor Organization and Operations in the United 
States. En: Promoting Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence and Effective-
ness. Sofia: Open Society Institute Sofia, 2008, p. 391; NEUBAUER, David 
W.; FRADELLA, Henry F. America’s Courts and the Criminal Justice System. 
Boston: Cengage, 2017, p. 192.
89 United Sates v. Nixon 418 US. 683, 693 (1974).
90 WEIGEND, Thomas. Germany, op. cit,, p. 266.
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with a task to support public order and legality91. The organization of 
the prosecution service, as well as selection and training, mirrors the 
system prescribed for judges and the courts of law92. These features mark 
the German prosecution service, at least on a normative level, as having 
strong regulations towards independence and impartiality. And yet the 
prosecutors in Germany are not considered as fully independent of the 
executive. The organization of the prosecution service with the Minister of 
Justice on top both at the federal and state level (§ 147 COA93) gives a clear 
impression of dependence on the executive94. Moreover, the prosecutors 
are obliged to carry out the orders of their superiors (§ 146 COA), which 
may relate both to types of cases in general as well as to any individual case. 
It is also permissible that at any time in the course of proceedings a case 
can be taken out of the hands of an individual prosecutor and reassigned 
to another (§ 145 COA). This all led the German Federal Constitutional 
Court to the conclusion that prosecution is a part of the executive95. The 
view of the majority would comply with this position, yet there are some 
who believe the opposite and some who would like to see prosecution as 
occupying an intermediate position between executive and judiciary96. 
And as a result, the German prosecutor is not seen as neutral enough to 
be able to make the decision to interfere with someone’s privacy in the 
form of ordering a search in a typical situation. 
91 TRENDAFILOVA, Ekaterina; RÓTH, Werner, op. cit., p. 213.
92 GILLIÉRON, Gwladys. Public Prosecutors in the United States and Europe. 
Cham: Springer, 2014, p. 264.
93 Court Organization Act (COA), Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) of 9 May 
1975.
94 WEIGEND, Thomas. The Prosecution Service in the German Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice. En: TAK, Peter J.P. (ed.). Tasks and Powers of the 
Prosecution Services in the EU Member States. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publish-
ers, 2004, p. 212.
95 BVerfGE 32, 216 and BVerfGE 103, 142, 156.
96 See discussion on that issue showing different perspectives by TRENDA-
FILOVA, Ekaterina; RÓTH, Werner, op. cit., p. 236. See also SIEGISMUND, 
Eberhard, op. cit., p. 64; ELSNER, Beatrix; PETERS, Julia. The Prosecution 
Service Function within the German Criminal Justice System. En: JEHLE, 
Jörg-Martin; WADE, Marianne (eds.). Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice 
Systems. The Rise of Prosecutorial Power Across Europe. Springer, Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2010, p. 208.
1616 | kReMenS, karolina.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 6, n. 3, p. 1585-1626, set.-dez. 2020. 
In Poland in the past it was assumed that the prosecution service 
is a part of the judiciary97. The connection with the judicial power was 
justified through the similar organizational structure of courts and the 
prosecution service, the joint system of education and training for judges 
and prosecutors, and the same salary as well as promotion structure in 
both groups. But the recent changes of law resulting from the Prosecution 
Service Act of 201698 aimed at the full subordination of the prosecution 
service to the Attorney General – the office held by the Minister of 
Justice – have changed the situation. Since the Attorney General gained 
the power to give instructions to any prosecutor regarding conducted 
investigations or prosecutions, including orders on what the person 
shall be charged with and with what kind of decision the individual case 
must be ended99, the Polish prosecution service cannot be presumed as 
anything other than fully subordinated to the executive100.
Perhaps the strongest position to that extent is held by the 
prosecutor in Italy. Italian prosecutors retain the judicial or at least 
quasi-judicial function101. This is a result of changes made to the Italian 
Constitution in 1948 that guaranteed the prosecutors the same level of 
independence as judges, positioning both groups within the judicial system 
(magitratura)102. Therefore, prosecutors are understood as independent 
of any other powers and bound by law to only act in compliance with the 
strongly pronounced principle of mandatory prosecution, i.e. the legality 
97 ZIĘBA-ZAŁUCKA, Hanna. Prokuratura w nowej ustawie z 2016 roku. Ek-
speryment z podległością władzy wykonawczej. Przegląd Prawa Konstytucy-
jnego, n. 33, 2016, p. 117 and sources cited in footnote 18.
98 Ustawa Prawo o prokuraturze [Prosecution Service Act] of 28 January 2016, 
Dz.U. 2016, poz. 177 (hereinafter: PSA 2016).
99 Article 8 PSA 2016.
100 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 
Opinion on the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office as Amended, No. 
892/2017, Strasbourg, 11 December 2017, https://www.venice.coe.int/web-
forms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)028-e, para. 115.
101 CAIANIELLO, Michele. The Italian Public Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Fig-
ure in Adversarial Proceedings. In: LUNA, Erik; WADE, Marianne (eds.). 
The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012, p. 250.
102 See Articles 104-106 of the Italian Constitution. 
1617
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 6, n. 3, p. 1585-1626, set.-dez. 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v6i3.412 |
principle (Article 112 of the Italian Constitution)103. Their role is to 
prosecute cases, but they also maintain full control over the investigation104. 
The prosecutors are also seen by the Italian Constitutional Court as “mere 
prosecutors, but also an organ of justice that is obliged to search for all 
elements of evidence that are relevant for the correct verdict, including 
any elements in favor of the accused”105. This all leads to the Italian 
prosecution service being positioned closer to the judicial and not the 
executive power106. And if it was indeed true that the Italian prosecutor is 
as independent and impartial as a judge it would be understandable that 
the prosecutor may have similar authority, including a power to impose 
during criminal investigation such coercive measures as search warrants. 
But the independence of the prosecution service as prescribed 
on the normative level does not remain uncontested107. Even Italian 
law seems to have some doubts when it comes to the full equality of 
judges and prosecutors. While the prosecutor is allowed to impose some 
coercive measures during criminal investigation, e.g. the search, seizure, 
summoning, and questioning of witnesses, other remain outside of his 
competencies - detention (Article 275 CCP-Italy) and the interception of 
communication (Article 267 CCP-Italy)108. This shows some lack of trust in 
prosecutors when making crucial decisions during a criminal investigation. 
Moreover, some scholars aptly argue that a system in which judges are 
structurally more proximate to the prosecutor than to the defendant can 
cause natural tendency to rule in favor of the prosecution, which leads 
103 ILLUMINATI, Giulio. The Role of the Public Prosecutor…, op. cit., p. 313.
104 RUGGIERI, Francesca; MARCOLINI, Stefano. Italy. En: LIGETI, Katalin 
(ed.). Toward a Prosecutor of the European Union, Volume 1: A Comparative 
Analysis. London: Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 369.
105 Corte Costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], 15 February 1991, no. 88.
106 MONTANA, Ricardo. Adversarialism in Italy: Using the Concept of Legal Cul-
ture to Understand Resistance to Legal Modifications and Its Consequences. 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, n. 20, 2012, p. 109.
107 SCACCIANOCE, Caterina. The principle of mandatory prosecution and the 
independence of public prosecutors in the Italian Criminal Justice System. 
ReAIDP/e-RIAPL A-01, 2010, p. 6.
108 See more on the scope of other coercive measures than search in Italian crim-
inal proceedings in RUGGIERI, Francesca; MARCOLINI, Stefano, op. cit., pp. 
370-389.
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to a clear violation of the equality-of-arms principle109. There are also 
some valid doubts whether the influence of the Ministry of Justice on 
the prosecution service exists110. 
Taking the presented arguments under consideration, one 
can wonder if the only factor that excludes the prosecutor from being 
competent to authorize searches is the subordination to the Ministry of 
Justice and the proximity that the prosecutor has towards the executive 
power. It seems that the relationship that the prosecutor builds with the 
criminal justice agencies, mainly the police, and his level of engagement 
in the conduct of criminal investigation remains relevant. 
This problem was addressed on several occasions by the US 
Supreme Court. For instance, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire111 it was 
confirmed that the Attorney General does not have the level of detachment 
and neutrality that is demanded from an authority issuing search warrants. 
The fact that the Attorney General of New Hampshire was formally 
and unquestionably authorized, under then-existing law, to issue search 
warrants as a justice of peace, became an important issue in this case. 
Even though he would regularly issue search warrants, such activity 
raised some valid questions. The Supreme Court pointed out that in this 
case the Attorney General took charge of all police activities relating to 
the murder at stake and took a role of the chief prosecutor in the trial 
following the investigation. This made it ultimately obvious that he could 
not be seen as sufficiently neutral. The relation that the Attorney General 
had with a case and with officers conducting the investigation made him 
too involved to be allowed to make such decisions as ordering a search. 
According to the US Supreme Court, participation in the search by the 
person that issued the search warrant is not compatible with a neutral 
and detached magistrate112. 
109 DI FEDERICO, Giuseppe. Prosecutorial Independence and the Democratic 
Requirement of Accountability in Italy: Analysis of a Deviant Case in a Com-
parative Perspective. British Journal of Criminology, n. 38, 1998, pp. 381-382.
110 CAIANIELLO, Michele. The Italian Public Prosecutor…, op. cit., p. 256.
111 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
112 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), para. 327 (“[the magistrate] 
allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party 
which was essentially a police operation. Once in the store, he conducted a 
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The decision to search should be made in a normal situation by 
an authority not engaged in criminal investigations, since only in this 
way can a desired level of objectivity and independence in the evaluation 
of this measure be ensured. This remains true for the engagement of 
every single prosecutor in proceedings in a case where the decision to 
conduct a search is to be made. But it also relates to the position of the 
prosecution service in general where the prosecution service remains in 
a long-term relationship with the criminal justice agencies conducting 
criminal investigations. How can one independently evaluate the need 
to conduct a search if one is pushed to grant authority by police officers 
with whom one works closely every day?
The prosecutor cannot guarantee such standards while he or 
she remains both organizationally and procedurally engaged in criminal 
investigation. This is a case for all continental countries. In Germany the 
control of the prosecutor of criminal investigations remains undisputed, 
allowing him to give orders to police officers while they conduct 
investigations (Article 161 (1) CCP-Germany)113. Similarly, in Italy 
the prosecution service supervises criminal investigations, exercising 
control over the investigating officers by giving orders and directing the 
investigative process114. The close connection that the Italian prosecutors 
retain with police during the conduct of criminal investigations is also 
clearly seen by the obligation of the police to immediately pass information 
(Article 347 (1) CCP-Italy) on the possible committing of a crime (notitia 
criminis) to the prosecutor as well as subordinating police to him (Article 
327 CCP-Italy). That immediately gives him full control over police 
actions115. This is also true for Poland, where the prosecutor – typically 
generalized search under authority of an invalid warrant; he was not acting as 
a judicial officer, but as an adjunct law enforcement officer”). Cf. Connally v. 
Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (In this case the US Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional the statute that authorized payment of five dollars to each mag-
istrate issuing a search warrant while no money was given to those denying 
warrants). See also similar arguments in cases involving payment received by 
judges upon conviction in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
113 GILLIÉRON, Gwladys, op. cit., p. 266.
114 CAIANIELLO, Michele. The Italian Public Prosecutor…, op. cit., p. 251.
115 This is true regardless of the fact that the police are not forbidden from undertak-
ing some investigative actions themselves, as provided in Article 348 CCP-Italy.
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known as “the master of proceedings” (dominus litis) – plays a key role 
during criminal investigations116. The Polish prosecutor either conducts 
the criminal investigation or supervises it in cases where the police are 
allowed by law to conduct it (Article 298 (1) CCP-Poland). Therefore, 
the scope of powers of the prosecutor especially with regard to control 
over police investigative actions is broad, including taking part in the 
investigation as well as giving orders to the police officers (Article 326 
(3) CCP-Poland). 
Such normatively prescribed prosecutorial control over criminal 
investigation might however be differently employed in practice. In 
particular in less serious cases, the prosecutorial engagement of the 
prosecutor might be visibly reduced or even somewhat illusionary until 
final decisions on how to end a case are made. But this does not undermine 
the strong relationship that bounds the prosecution service and the police 
built to achieve the aim of obtaining enough evidence to prove the guilt of 
the defendant. They work closely on a daily basis, even if this cooperation 
is stronger in the case of more serious crimes. They discuss, consult, and 
investigate together. Therefore, this long-term bond makes it hard or 
even impossible to make decisions independently enough to aspire to the 
high standard demanded by the imposition of such measures as search.
The close relationship of the prosecutor with the law enforcement 
authorities and his involvement in the course of procedural activities 
undertaken during the criminal process makes his perspective too narrow, 
or even tunneled, which makes it impossible to objectively assess the need 
for searches. It seems that vesting in prosecutorial hands the power to 
decide on such a measure results more from the pragmatic reasons aimed 
at the quick and efficient conduct of criminal investigations without 
resorting to judicial authority.
Iv. conclusIons
As aptly summed up by the US Supreme Court in Brinegar v 
U.S., “[u]ncontrolled search and seizure are the first and most effective 
116 NOWAK, Celina; STEINBORN, Sławomir, op. cit., p. 499.
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weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government”117. It remains true 
for every legal system, regardless of whether inquisitorial or adversarial. 
It is clear that restrictions imposed on the right to privacy should be 
applied in a way that protects the individual to the highest possible 
extent. Notwithstanding the need to conduct effective investigations to 
fight crime efficiently, coercive measures shall only be performed when 
they are necessary and only when certain grounds are met. 
It is broadly accepted that officers engaged in the daily work 
of law enforcement agencies are incapable of evaluating properly the 
need to conduct searches. Therefore, searches must be subjected to the 
scrutiny of an independent organ that would be entitled to authorize 
these measures prior to their execution and assess them when they have 
already taken place. As the research shows, the prosecutor cannot be 
regarded as such an authority. The assumed proximity to the executive 
power excludes the prosecutor from being granted with the same level of 
impartiality and independence as the judge, even if the legal provisions 
in some countries tend to prove the opposite. And even more important 
is the relationship that the prosecutor builds with the police and other 
law enforcement agencies conducting criminal investigations. The close 
cooperation built upon the cases investigated and prosecuted together 
with criminal justice agencies raises the likelihood that the prosecutor 
will become prejudiced towards the investigative actions planned and 
conducted by these agencies. Therefore, it should be considered that 
the prosecutor does not have the necessary amount of objectivity 
required in such cases.
This altogether makes the prosecutor incompetent to authorize 
searches, regardless of whether it is done prior to the search or post-
factum. Such power should be granted solely to the judge as an authority 
providing the adequate protection of the rights of the person to privacy. 
The judicial oversight of searches does not guarantee lawful and reasonable 
behavior in all cases, but it undoubtedly increases the protection of an 
individual’s rights.
117 Brinegar v US 338 US 160 (1949) 180.
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